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STRUCTURE INSPECTION
The requirement to operate a civil transport aircraft on scheduled operations for
a period of perhaps 15 to 20 years, with a constant level of safety, creates a need for a
system of continuous monitoring of the structure. At the same time it is implicit that
no unnecessary work should be done and that the time out of service should be minimal.
It is perhaps necessary first to outline the approach to the maintenance and
inspection of the components and systems of the aircraft. It has become apparent that
most components, and therefore systems, suffer primarily from random effects. In a
relatively few cases a life can also be dictated by a wear-out rate, but random defects
predominate and have to be dealt with by inspections and functional checks so that the
defect is detected at the earliest opportunity.
By duplication, or triplication, the integrity of the aircraft can be maintained, and
the study of reliability levels can set the periods for inspection or checks which limit
the period of dormant failure. Since a large number of components are functioned on
each flight, the number of additional checks required to reveal a dormant fault is
reduced.
It can be seen that for systems and components, the optimum periods for inspec-
tion, maintenance, and overhaul can be safely developed in respect of a particular air-
craft type and a particular operation by a process of recording and analysing data on
failures and strip reports and by general experience gained in service. The aircraft
itself determines its own maintenance schedule.
In respect of structures, a different approach has to be adopted. With the advent
of fail-safe structures, the duplication of load path which provides failure survivability
has been achieved. Unfortunately, no ready indication of failure is available. The
purpose of inspection is therefore to detect failures before they become catastrophic,
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andto detect such deterioration with time and use which, in itself, will lead to failure.
The object of maintenance is to restore the structure to its original condition and to main-
tain the failure survivability originally built into it.
It is natural that there should be a desire to use the same downtime of the aircraft
to deal both with structure and systems. Improved component life and improved relia-
bility lead to longer intervals between major maintenance inputs. There is therefore an
inevitable clash of requirements because the structure tends to deteriorate with age and
demands increased vigilance.
The structure inspection that emerges is therefore a compromise influenced by
opportunity, and it changes with time. In deciding initially on the nature and extent of
inspection, the design philosophy and the background of fatigue and fail-safe substantia-
tion tests are of paramount importance. A structure inspection schedule for the lead
fleet of a new type of aircraft is arrived at by extracting the structure content from the
total schedule. A typical structure schedule is outlined as follows (in this schedule flight-
hours and flights are approximately the same):
At each departure and at each 72 hours elapsed time: A general walk-around
check which would detect gross damage, due to either serious structural failure or
damage inflicted on the ground.
At each 300 hours or flights: A general visual inspection of the complete
exterior, supplemented by opportunity inspection of such areas where access is
required for maintenance and servicing. This check is also used to monitor any
item on special surveillance.
At 2000 hours (12 to 15 months): A more detailed visual inspection of the
lower fuselage, externally and internally, including pressure bulkheads, and door-
surround structure. This is aimed primarily at detecting corrosion. Ultrasonic
checks are also made at this interval on bonded stringers in the lower fuselage,
and radiographic inspection is made in those areas of the lower fuselage not acces-
sible for visual inspection.
At 5000 to 6000 hours or flights (2 to 21years): The major maintenance
\ /
check in which all access panels are removed and all structure inspected visually.
This represents the most detailed routine visual inspection of the structure possible
by normal access, that is, without stripping out interior trim and lagging. At the
same intervals - but not necessarily at the same time - radiographic inspections
are made of closed structures such as
Horizontal stabilizer
Fin
Primary control surfaces
Slats, flaps, airbrakes, and so forth
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All these inspections are carried out on all aircraft in the fleet. The extensive
areas of the internal structure of the upper fuselage (abovefloor level) are the subject
of a sampling procedure. This approachis madebecauseof the extensivedowntime
involved if all trim, soundproofing,thermal lagging, air ducts, and soforth are removed.
Experience has shownthat the area below floor level is that most prone to corrosion.
This can occur early in the aircraft life andcan progress relatively rapidly. Experience
also suggeststhat the upper areas dry out more rapidly, andcorrosion is only likely at
a later stageandwill develop less rapidly.
The sampling programme is therefore started in aboutthe 5thyear of operation
(10 000to 12000 hours). Becauseof the large work load anddowntime involved, radio-
graphic inspection is used extensively but is supportedby visual inspection as follows:
In eachof the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th years of operation, onecomposite aircraft is examined,
25percent by visual meansand 75percent by radiographic means. The samples involve
not less than 60percent of the fleet, andat the endof this period one complete composite
fuselagewill havebeenexaminedvisually; andthree, radiographically. It is plannedthat
after the 9th year the sampling will be extendedso that by the 20thyear all aircraft in the
fleet will havebeenexaminedcompletely bothvisually and radiographically.
The choiceof inspection methodis basically economic. Wherevisual inspection is
viable, it is preferred. Radiographyis anadequatetool to detect the significant cracking
of internal structure such as frames, stringers, andcleats. It canalso indicate corro-
sion and paint flaking - but requires considerable skill in interpretation. A 10-percent
reduction in material thickness canbe reliably detected,provided the corrosion deposits
are not retained. The critical corrosion along the heel line of a stringer or lap joint is
detected mainly by evidenceon the adjoining surface.
In a particular casewhere this inspection schedulehas beenapplied up to an aver-
age aircraft life of 12000 flights or 6 years, 38defects have beenidentified. Of these,
16 involved fatigue cracks, in secondarystructure, andtwo involved corrosion in primary
structure. Most of thesedefects were detectedon the major check. In the period con-
cerned, the major check period hasbeenprogressively increased from 3000to 5000hours,
or flights, on the basis that those items which haveshownup andare not subject to modi-
fication action are retained as specific items on the annualor 300-hour inspection.
For detection of deterioration that could be the causeof fatigue, this increase in
the major checkperiod is feasible. If, however, the major check is to form the basis
for detection of fatigue cracks concernedwith the fail-safe design concept,then the period
betweeninspections must havesome finite limit. This shouldbe the interval assumedin
the design conceptfrom first detectablecrack to the point at which crack propagation
reducesthe static strength to proof load. Ideally, this shouldbe demonstratedby a full-
scale test for all fatigue-critical regions of the structure. For the aircraft concerned
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the period is not less than 5000flights, with proof load applied each2500flights. On
this basis eachaircraft structure must be examinedin detail at maximum intervals of
5000flights. It might well be argued,however, that whenthe aircraft life is relatively
low, so that this interval represents a significant part of the probable scatter between
identical failures on aircraft of the same fleet, then staggeredinspection over a longer
period is perhapsjustified on the basis that no cracked aircraft will fly more than 5000
flights before the defect is detectedin another of them. It is implicit that all aircraft
will be checkedwithin a short period from the discovery of the first defect.
As the aircraft life increases, so that the safe period of crack propagationbecomes
small in relation to the probable scatter in failure, the inspection would haveto be
increased to cover eachaircraft in 5000flights. As the aircraft life increases still fur-
ther so that the probability of failure is high andsimultaneousfailures becomeprobable,
it would beprudent to reduce the inspection interval.
Finally, it would seem logical that whilst the ratio of test life to aircraft life is 5
or more, inspection canbedoneon a sampling basis only, to assess the general deterio-
ration, suchas corrosion. Thus, an ideal structure inspection schedulewould result and
wouldbe basedon aircraft life andtest life. (Seefig. 1.) The practical problem would
thenbe to integrate this schedulewith the remainder of the maintenancerequirements
andthe seasonaldemandsonaircraft.
If there are several operators involved in making upa significant fleet of "lead"
aircraft, there is a casefor spreadingthe initial sampling across all the aircraft to thus
reduce the requirement on the individual operator. This involves a reporting system so
that the manufacturer can coordinate results. There are possibly limitations to this
approach, since eachoperator tends to operateon a different route structure andin a
different environment.
Most aircraft types operatedby British EuropeanAirways (B.E.A.) have carried
some form of in-flight recording equipment,either fleetwise or on selected aircraft. In
somecases this hasbeena condition in the terms of the warranty on the fatigue life of
the primary structure. The recording equipmenthas fallen into two categories:
(1) Continuousrecording of acceleration thresholds or strain-range thresholds
on entire fleets
(2) Continuousrecording of acceleration thresholds together with other flight data
on a limited number of aircraft
In the first category, counting accelerometers mounted at the center of gravity record
threshold counts at increments of 0.2g between 0 and 2g. Total counts in each level are
read and recorded at each 300-hour check.
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Fatigue-meter data are fed back to the respective manufacturers at intervals,
together with operational data from which a typical flight plan, representative of the
route network, can be deduced. This is done by taking significant samples of summer
and winter operations and includes take-off weight, fuel state at take-off, cruise altitude,
and flight duration. Fuel burn-off is computed and thus actual weight and fuel state at
each phase of flight are deduced. The aircraft manufacturer then computes fatigue dam-
age rate and compares this with the damage rate used in the fatigue test or calculated
fatigue life.
Similar procedures are adopted in the case of strain-range counters, except that
these give a more direct indication of damage rate and require less operational data.
In both cases the manufacturers concerned have stated that an increase in service
life of up to 30 percent has been possible compared with the service life that would other-
wise be imposed. So far, this has all been in respect of those parts of the structure
which are on a "safe life" basis.
Both these types of recording instrument are such that they are quite practical for
an airline to carry on all aircraft. They need little attention and are reasonably reliable.
As long as there are safe-life items in the primary structure, the improvement in life
that has been possible would appear to be adequate return.
The more comprehensive type of observer unit is more questionable. Attempts
have been made on two types of aircraft to get a simultaneous record of acceleration
counts, speed, height, time of flight, and so forth by use of film recorders, switched on
at take-off and off on landing by an airspeed switch. They have been installed in perhaps
two aircraft of a new fleet with the object of obtaining more complete data for an initial
period. The problems with film recorders have been
(1) Short duration of film leading to either much lost recording time, or very
frequent film changes
(2) Unserviceability revealed only after film development
(3) Reference still required to flight documents to obtain aircraft weight and
other data
(4) Low order of reliability
The authors have found from experience that only about 10 percent of the total hours
flown by the aircraft equipped with the film recorders were satisfactorily recorded. It
does not seem practical to use this type of equipment in the environment of day-to-day
airline operation.
It has been B.E.A. policy to record manually maximum cabin differential pressures
for each flight on all aircraft. The pilot records this in an appropriate box in the techni-
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cal log. This information is extracted and the total flights in each band of pressure, in
increments of 1/2 psi, are computed. Where there are maximum lives prescribed for
modification or replacement of structure, this information is forwarded to the manufac-
turers and to the airworthiness authorities at six monthly intervals. All unrecorded
flights are assumed to be at maximum differential pressure, and a factor of 10 percent
is added to the recorded pressures to allow for inaccuracies of recording. At the same
time, the equivalent flights at maximum differential pressure are computed and forwarded
to the inspection department to allow mandatory life requirements to be monitored.
This policy has yielded significant benefits where safe-life situations have existed.
It allows advantage to be taken of all flights where only low pressures are needed, yet
retains the advantage of operational flexibility, such as cruise altitude on longer flight
sections and occasional high rates of descent. This flexibility is otherwise lost if pres-
sure is permanently reduced. On one type of aircraft it has allowed an extension from
12 500 to 30 000 flights before a major modification, with its accompanying weight penalty,
was required and from 17 000 to 50 000 flights before wholesale replacement of fuselage
skins.
It is true to say that the advantages so far gained by continuous recording in airline
operation have all been associated with safe-life structure situations. It is questionable
whether real advantages can accrue in the case of a truly fail-safe structure. One of the
advantages, to the manufacturer, of a fail-safe philosophy is that the duration of the full-
scale test can be reduced. If the structure is designed for a long fatigue life, it is prob-
able that natural failures will not be produced on test. Provided adequate fail-safe tests
are carried out, this may be satisfactory from an airworthiness point of view, but it would
seem pointless, in this case, to try and correlate test and actual aircraft usage in order
to try and predict the operator's long-term planning requirements.
Only if full-scale testing is extended until fatigue failures occur - and perhaps only
if these then indicate the need to impose a finite life when action must be taken - can
better data on actual aircraft usage yield some dividends.
MAINTENANCE ASPECTS
It will be appreciated that although the modern public transport aircraft is a highly
complex and sophisticated engineering product, it is also the means by which the air-
lines earn their revenue. The aircraft utilisation rate, which varies during the year and
reaches its peak during the summer months, is laid upon a foundation of known work pro-
grammes which stipulate that various aircraft will be undergoing maintenance for block
periods of time during the year. It will be seen, therefore, that in order to support the
commercial plans, an extremely well-devised maintenance programme is required. For
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an airline to operate at optimum efficiency, the maintenanceprogrammes are plannedto
ensure that the work requirement is matchedby the necessary spares, materials, tools,
equipment,and labour at the commencementof the hangarcheck.
The unexpectedandnonscheduledproblem is, therefore, strictly an economicembar-
rassment. The discovery of a fatigue crack, corrosion, or anyof the other mechanical
faults which besetairline operators from time to time andwhich must be repaired on an
urgent basis are the oneswhich really causethe headaches.
Ideally, the airline engineeringbase shouldbe a facility carrying out plannedmain-
tenanceand changingor repairing wornout components. This is, of course, an ideal sit-
uation which never exists in practice. For instance, a piece of ground-support equipment
could be run into the side of anaeroplaneandthus causea delay to the service. Simi-
larly, the work necessary to repair the unexpectedcrack in a major piece of structure
can soonseriously upset the best plannedengineeringcommitment andrapidly leadto
nonavailability of aircraft.
It must also be remembered that there will be an internal conflict of interests within
the airline. The production andmaintenancedepartmentsare chargedwith producing
aeroplanesfor service to meet the commercial demands,and an engineeringrequire-
ment which may extendthe hangarcheck times or takes aircraft out of service is resisted,
unless vital to continued safe operation. Also, since modern aircraft construction is
making ever-increasing use of integrally machined components, which in themselves are
much more difficult to repair in terms of time and complexity than the riveted skin-
stringer combination, it also follows that the flow of spare parts from the manufacturer
in the event of a rash of fatigue problems across the fleet could be inadequate to meet
the demand.
All aircraft exhibit cracks in various structural components. Many of these, hav-
ing relieved a local stress condition, will then remain static in length for a considerable
period of time, and the aircraft will continue in service with these known defects. Nor-
mally such defects are examined for signs of propagation at each scheduled inspection
until the part can be replaced or repaired, ideally at a convenient hangar check. This
applies mainly to multi-load-path and secondary structure, but of course all cracks and
defects are evaluated and a course of action decided upon which is dependent upon the
significance of the defect. In the case of more serious defects the normal procedure is
to raise a special check on the remainder of the fleet to determine the extent of the prob-
lem fleetwise. The speed at which the fleet examination takes place, of course, depends
upon the severity of the initial defect. In this way the extent of the problem is assessed
and the final action will take the form of a modification or repair, which can be raised
either by the airline or manufacturer, or by replacement on a lifed basis. In many cases
the defect is subsequently monitored by the addition of a specific item to the approved
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maintenanceschedulefor inspection at appropriate intervals, or included in the reportable
structural inspection programme.
In the caseof a repair, the structure is usually returned to the "as new" condition,
but whenthis is impractical or economically not justified, the fatigue life of the repair
must at least matchthe residual life of the aircraft. In manycaseswhenextensivetest-
ing or investigation of a fatigue problem is required, it maybe necessaryto incorporate
a temporary repair which satisfies limit loads andthus keepsthe aircraft flying. The
long-term action which may require a slightly more extensiverepair can thenbe carried
out at a later stage, usually at a major overhaul. It hasbeenfoundfrom experiencethat
the manufacturer's solution to most light-alloy fatigue failures invariably results in a
steel replacement.
Oncea defect is found, a repeat inspectionof the area is established, which canbe
extremely frequent in serious cases. The general accessibility and nature of the defect
will determine the methodof inspection, that is, visual or nondestructive testing tech-
niques. In any event the general aim is to implement modification-campaign action to
eliminate the defect and its associated inspection.
When a new defect is found, the airline informs the manufacturer, who then advises
all operators of similar equipment to inspect for that particular defect. The manufactur-
er's notification usually ranges from a newsletter covering general advice, the service
bulletin which forms the usual channel of communication, to the service cable for serious
problems which require rapid investigation.
Since fatigue failures are generally related to total flying hours or landings, it fol-
lows that an airline operating "young" aircraft is less likely to be hit by the nonscheduled
problem than an operator with older aircraft of the same type, and has a better chance of
carrying out the rectification on a planned basis.
A large number of fatigueproblems encountered can be traced to detaildesign
faults,and occasionally the classic "don'ts," such as sharp section changes and stress
raisers, stillseem to be perpetuated.
Ithas been found from experience thatunnecessary disturbance of an area during
maintenance can in fact be detrimental in the long run. For example, abrasion of sur-
faces can break down sealants,particularlyin integralfueltanks, and minute scratches
are then susceptible to corrosion or crack initiation.
The Corporation is an approved design organisation and designs and incorporates a
great deal of repair work, particularlyto components. For example, the Corporation has
a great deal of experience on the repair of honeycomb structures. Any repair work must
maintain the aircraft to airworthiness requirements. This, of course, includes correct
heaf-treafment techniques, particularlywith the high-strength steels,and maintenance
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of adequate strength reserves after such rework. A copy of the repairs is automatically
sent to the manufacturer for his information, but naturally in the event of serious prob-
lems the manufacturer is consulted prior to making the repair.
Although the primary airframe structure, critical joints, representative panels,
and the like are subjected to extensive fatigue testing at the design and construction stage
to prove the integrity of the basic airframe, secondary structure does not receive the
same consideration. Experience shows that defects in secondary structure tend to be
repetitive and are both costly and time consuming to repair or replace. For example,
certain areas of most aircraft floors require frequent replacement because of corrosion
under and adjacent to galley and toilet areas and for damage due to cargo loading and
repeated walking traffic. It would seem that the original floor is largely designed by
static load requirements on the grounds that a stronger and longer lasting floor, because
of the weight penalty incurred, is not justifiable on economic grounds. This, of course,
is all good theory, but replacement floor costs are extremely high. Because of the
absence of reliable fatigue data on floor materials, various sandwich floor-panel mate-
rials were investigated on a cost-effective basis which involved static testing and fatigue
testing a large number of samples. In fact, representative panels of various materials
have been installed for service evaluation. The airline is, of course, ideally suited to
perform actual in-service tests, and new ideas are often subjected to field tests in a
true operational environment. Although in the manufacturer's initial fatigue test every
attempt is made to represent a true operational condition, it sometimes happens that
despite the best efforts of the designer, a part will fail prematurely because of the influ-
ence of a secondary unknown or neglected loading system. A case in point recently
occurred when a fairly substantial shear angle hidden from immediate view was found
to have cracks of considerable length along the bend radius. On investigation the frac-
ture face showed that the angle, which had been designed to carry shear loads, was in
fact also being subjected to secondary bending loads which tended to open and close the
angle. Fortunately, in this case, the cracks were found before a failure occurred.
Another example in which the initial design failed to take complete account of the
full loading cycle is the fatigue cracks experienced in top wing skins of some aluminium
alloys containing a high percentage of zinc. The alloy is chosen in the first instance
because of its mechanical properties and because the normal flight loads give a com-
pressive loading. It has been established, however, that the ground loads, which reverse
the wing bending system, cause tensile loads of sufficient magnitude to cause fatigue
cracks around stress concentrations, fastener holes, for example, in this material.
One interesting case of structural failure occurred when the designer had assumed
a certain airspeed for flaps extended for his fatigue analysis within the flaps-out speed
range. The pilots, however, were in fact flying the aircraft right up to the flap limit
speed, and premature failures occurred. Another problem which occurred was that in
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the original design certain assumptionswere madewith respect to groundturns based
uponairports knownat that time. Subsequentlythe Commercial Departmentdecidedthat
a great deal of revenuewas forthcoming from lesser knownairports, and groundmanoeu-
vres in excessof the assumptionswere made. Airports are very congestedplaceson the
groundas well as in the air, and groundturns canbe dictated by available groundspace.
An aspectof airline usagewhich is outside the normal operating pattern is crew
training. It is quite normal for oneaeroplane to spenda considerable time on a training
detail, andthis operation sometimes results in flying techniqueswhich are not up to nor-
mal standards. The number of landingsare very considerableover a short period of
time and since one of the objects of the exercise is to acquaintflying crews with aircraft-
handlingcharacteristics which are seldom met in practice, the airframe is subjectedto
a great numberof loads which are not normally met in passengerservice. These facts
must be recognizedat the designstage. Airframe damagehas, in fact, resulted from
training details.
Civil aircraft are in service for a considerableperiod of time, some 15years or
more typically. Airframe lives on the order of 60000flying hours are commonplace
with the current generationof aircraft, andof course the fatigue problem intensifies as
the aircraft get older. The economicsof airline operation is such that operators are
carrying out life-extension programmes in order to achieve these lives by replacing
and/or reworking critical areas at somestageduring the service life of the aircraft. It
is vital, therefore, that the initial assumptions,analysis, andtesting faithfully represent
as far as possible the complete loadingprogramme and its environment, andthat the
effect of newmaterials is fully examined,particularly where noprevious experience is
available.
Each newgenerationof aircraft brings a new challengeboth to the operator and
manufacturer, andthe SSTwill be no exception. The operator must rely on the manu-
facturer to provide a trouble-free product, andto this end,practical airline experience
of day-to-day operational problems and practices is freely available. Operational expe-
rience shouldbe fed back into new designsto ensure long, trouble-free lives, particularly
at the detail designstage.
The addition of speedandtemperature will bring newcomplications to the SST. It
is to be hopedthat the racehorse will not exhibit the temperamentof a thoroughbredbut
will retain the cart-horse stamina for everyday reliability.
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